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Comments
THE DEPLETION DEDUCTION WITH RESPECT TO OIL AND
GAS INTERESTS UNDER THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX*
The Constitution takes no articulate cognizance of depletion
as a deduction from gross income in computing the federal in-
come tax. The body of law governing this deduction is made up
0 For other treatments of this subject, see Comment (1937) 51 Harv. L.
Rev. 1424; Beveridge, The Depletion of Oil and Gas Properties for Income
Tax Purposes (1938) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 568; 2 Paul and Mertens, The Law of
Federal Income Taxation (1934) c. 21; and excellent discussion in Rabkin and




of a variety of statutes,1 administrative2 and other rulings,8 and
decisions of the federal courts and of the Board of Tax Appeals
and the Court of Claims.
I. NATURE AND THEORY OF THE DEDUCTION
The Sixteenth Amendment authorized Congress to "lay and
collect taxes on income from whatever source derived." Although
it would seem that the "income" referred to would be the "true
net income,"' the courts have interpreted this power to levy taxes
to extend to "gross income." Thus it is said that "every deduc-
tion from gross income is alloWed as a matter of legislative grace
and only as there is clear provision therefor can any particular
deduction be allowed."
'
Depletion is one of the deductions authorized by law, and is
intended to allow the tax-free return of the cost element out of
1. Section 23(m) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes "such reason-
able [depletion] allowance in all cases to be made under rules and regula-
tions to be prescribed by the Commissioner [of Internal Revenue] with the
approval of the Secretary [of the Treasury]." See Section 114(b) of the
Code for the alternative percentage depletion allowance.
2. U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, §§ 19.23(m)-i to 19.23(m)-28 (authorized by the
Secretary of the Treasury) covers the depletion allowance. Amendments to
these regulations are the "Treasury Decisions," issued also with the approval
of the Secretary of the Treasury.
3. Interpretations issued without the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury, e.g., "General Counsel's Memoranda."
4. The income referred to in the Sixteenth Amendment should be in-
come in its true sense, not gross proceeds, which may include a return of
capital. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9(4). In Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 481, 49 S.Ct.
199, 201, 73 L.Ed. 460, 463 (1929), the court said: "the settled doctrine is that
the 16th Amendment confers no power upon Congress to define and tax as
income without apportionment something which theretofore could not have
been properly regarded as income." Hence Congress is no more free to tax
"gross proceeds" than it was before the amendment. See Evans v. Gore, 253
U.S. 245, 40 S.Ct. 550, 64 L.Ed. 887 (1920). Depletion and other substantive
capital deductions should be excluded from "income" as used in the Constitu-
tion solely by dint of the fact that they are essentially a return of capital,
which was never intended to be subjected to the income tax. Eisner v. Ma-
comber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521, 9 A.L.R. 1570 (1920). These
substantive deductions should be contradistinguished from other deductions
which are essentially acts of grace, such as the allowance for charitable
contributions. In a treatment of the depletion deduction in Comment (1937)
51 Harv. L. Rev. 1424, it Is stated: "it would seem that a tax on the gross
Income from an oil well without allowing a deduction for incurred depletion
would be in part a direct tax on capital and thus have to be apportioned."
For the Treasury's view that the Sixteenth Amendment is a grant of power
to tax gross Income, see Taxation of Government Bondholders and Em-
ployees (1939) 91 et seq.
5. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 54 S.Ct. 788, 78 L.Ed.
1348 (1934); Helvering v. Inter-Mountain Life Ins. Co., 294 U.S. 686, 55 S.Ct.
572, 79 L.Ed. 1227 (1935); White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 59 S.Ct. 179, 83
L.Ed. 172 (1938).
6. White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292, 59 S.Ct. 179, 184, 83 L.Ed. 172,
179 (1938).
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the gross proceeds from the operation of mines, oil and gas wells,
other natural deposits,7 and timber. The theory of the allowance
is that as the gas and oil produced from the wells is sold, a grad-
ual sale of the taxpayer's capital investment in the property is
being made. "The depletion charge permitted as a deduction from
the gross income in determining the taxable income.. . represents
the reduction in the mineral content of the reserves from which
the product is taken."s
Inasmuch as depletion is designed to return to the taxpayer
his capital interest or the cost to him, it seems natural that the
general rule for determining the allowance would be the cost
recovery method. An alternative method-the discovery method
-is available in the case of mines (except coal, inetal, and sul-
phur mines)," but this will not be considered here because the
term "mine" does not include oil and gas wells.10 The alternative
method in the case of oil and gas wells is the percentage method,
wherein a flat 27/% of the taxpayer's gross income from his oil
or gas property is used as the depletion allowance.
II. WHO MAY TAKE THE DEDUCTION
Every owner of an economic interest in the mineral deposits
is allowed the annual depletion deduction.11 An economic interest
is possessed in every case in which the taxpayer has acquired by
investment any interest in the mineral in place and secures in-
come derived from the severance and sale of the mineral, to
which he must look for a return of capital.1 2 This interest may be
acquired by any form of legal relationship, and "the formal attri-
butes of [the] instruments (whether assignment, lease, sublease,
et cetera) or the descriptive terminology which may be applied to
them in the local [state] law are both irrelevant."113
7. For comprehensive list of mineral deposits included, see U.S. Treas.
Reg. 103 § 19.23(m)-1-(d), which enumerates, among others, building stone,
clay, fuller's earth, gravel, peat, precious stones, salt, sulphur, and soapstone.
8. United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 302, 47 S.Ct. 608, 610, 71 L.Ed. 1054,
1058 (1927). Depletion is not regarded as a special bonus for enterprise and,
willingness to assume risks. Untermeyer v. Commissioner, 59 F.(2d) 1004
(C.C.A. 2d, 1932), cert. denied 287 U.S. 647, 53 S. Ct. 92, 77 L.Ed. 559 (1932).
9. Percentage depletion since 1932 has been available in the case of coal,
metal, and sulphur. However, the percentage allowed as depletion is 5 per
centum of the gross income for coal, 15 per centum for metal, and 23 per
centum for sulphur mines. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-5, and In-
ternal Revenue Code, § 114(b)-4.
10. U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-l-(e).
11. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 53 S.Ct. 225, 77 L.Ed. 489 (1933).
12. US. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-i.
13. Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 53 S.Ct. 225, 77 L.Ed. 489 (1933). In
that case the court held that whether the instrument was called an assign-
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The depletion allowances are not confined to the fee owner,
but are available to any who have an interest in the substance to
be depleted. Thus, where a wife had an equitable interest which
arose out of an implied (purchase money resulting) trust, she had
a depletable interest, although legal title was in her husband."'
The instrument by which the taxpayer acquires need not, more-
over, convey the deposits themselves; a right to extract the min-
eral and reduce it to possession is sufficient.15 But a mere permit
to drill, with the option of obtaining a lease if oil was found,
would not vest the holder with a depletable economic interest.(
Although only an economic interest in the oil or gas in place is
required, this does not include a mere "economic advantage" de-
rived from production, through a contractual relation to the
owner, by one who has no capital investment in the mineral de-
posit. 7 , An example of a contract of this type is the casing-head
gas contract, where one purchases casing-head gas from the pro-
ducer and processes it. In Hurley v. United States,8 the court
said: "One who buys the oil at the mouth of the well owns the
oil, but has no interest in the oil 'in place.'" It seems that the
economic interest must extend, one might say, down through the
mouth of the well into the oil or gas in place. This was the situa-
tion in Signal Gasoline Corporation v. Commissioner,19 where the
casing-head operator had the right to connect his pipes directly
with the oil wells and extract the gas by means of lifts and other
devices. The court emphasized the fact that it was the operator
who performed the extraction of the gas, and that the intention
of the parties was that the operator should have an interest in all
gas he might reduce to possession.'0
ment or sublease under Louisiana law was immaterial. In Burnet v. Har-
mel, 287 U.S. 103, 110, 53 S.Ct. 74, 77, 77 L.Ed. 199, 205 (1932), the court said:
"State law may control only when the operation of the Federal taxing act, by
express language or necessary implication, makes its own operation depend-
ent upon state law. [The tax act] should be interpreted so as to give a uni-
form application to a nationwide scheme of taxation." See Lyeth v. Hoey,
305 U.S. 188, 59 S.Ct. 155, 83 L.Ed. 119 (1938).
14. Commissioner v. Molter, 60 F.(2d) 498 (C.C.A. 10th, 1932).
15. Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens, 267 U.S. 364, 45 S.Ct. 274, 69 L.Ed. 660
(1925).
16. United States v. Spaulding, 97 F.(2d) 701 (C.C.A. 9th, 1938), cert. denied
305 U.S. 644, 59 S.Ct. 147, 83 L.Ed. 415 (1938). In that case the holder of the
permit never obtained the lease, but sold it to another who drilled, found
oil, and obtained the lease.
17. U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-i.
18. 10 F.Supp. 365 (N.D. Okla. 1935).
19. 66 F.(2d) 886 (C.C.A. 9th, 1933).
20. The leading case on this point is Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303
U.S. 362, 58 S.Ct. 616, 82 L.Ed. 897 (1938). The distinction between an eco-
nomic interest and an economic advantage seems to be whether the mineral
1942]
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A mere owner of shares in a corporation which itself owns
oil and gas interests is not entitled to the benefit of the depletion
deduction. 21 The corporation is a separate entity and a non-con-
ductor;22 when the earnings are distributed to the stockholders,
the character of their origin is lost. As their character as a partial
return of capital exists only in the hands of the corporation, the
corporation alone can take the deduction. In no case may the
same depletion be taken by more than one party, and "the same
basic issue determines both to whom income derived from the
production of oil and gas is taxable and to whom a deduction for
depletion is allowable. '2 8
But where the separate legal entity is a conductor-such as a
trust or a partnership-a different situation presents itself. In the
case of the partnership, the matter is simply that the partner
must include in his gross income his share of the partnership's net
profit, whether distributed or not.24 Since the income is then tax-
able to the partner, not the partnership, it is the partner who is
given the deduction.
With trusts the matter is somewhat different. The beneficiaries
of a trust which holds depletable mineral interests are entitled to
make the deduction from income realized to them from such min-
eral production. But although the trust is a conductor, the bene-
ficiaries are taxed only on the distributed portion of the trust
income-the trust itself is taxed on the part undistributed. By
applying the fundamental principle that the same basic issue de-
termines both to whom income derived from the production of oil
and gas is taxable and to whom a deduction for depletion is al-
lowable,25 the'trust will be taxed and may take depletion on the
undistributed portion, and the beneficiaries will be taxed and may
take depletion on the distributed portion of the trust income.28
has been removed artificially. The interest in the oil in place must be in the
oil in its natural place. See Atlas Milling Co. v. Jones, 115 F.(2d) 61 (C.C.A.
10th, 1940), cert. denied 312 U.S. 686, 61 S.Ct. 613, 85 L.Ed. 1124 (1941), where
the court held that "natural deposits" does not include mineral dumps arti-
ficially deposited. This would apply to oil artificially "deposited" at the
mouth of the well.
21. Helvering v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S. 370, 58 S.Ct. 619, 82 L.Ed. 903 (1938).
22. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 38 S.Ct. 543, 62 L.Ed. 1149 (1918).
23. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 407, 60 S.Ct. 952, 954, 84 L.Ed.
1277, 1279 (1940).
24. Internal Revenue Code, § 182.
25. See note 23 supra.
26. In the absence of controlling provisions in the trust instrument. In-
ternal Revenue Code, § 23(m). Merle-Smith v. 'Commissioner, 42 F.(2d) 837
(C.C.A. 2d, 1930), cert. denied 282 U.S. 897, 51 S.Ct. 182, 75 L.Ed. 791 (1931).
See also Fleming v. Commissioner, 121 F.(2d) 7 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941).
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Some conflict appears on the question whether a beneficiary
who has no remainder interest in the capital of the trust may take
depletion on the trust distributions to him. In Helvering v. Falk,2"
Justice McReynolds held for the majority that a beneficiary who
had no remainder interest in the corpus of the trust nevertheless
had such an economic interest as to entitle him to take the deple-
tion deduction; and that this might be done even though the set-
tlor has not capitalized the wasting asset by providing for a de-
pletion reserve or otherwise, but merely provided for the pay-
ment to the beneficiaries of the gross proceeds less expenses.
Three dissentient justices - Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo - in-
sisted that one holding no remainder interest or capital invest-
ment, but only a right to gross proceeds from mineral property,
could not take depletion; and that the framework erected by the
settlor, and not the character of the interest, should govern. The
upshot of this view is that the deduction is lost where the settlor
does not capitalize his oil or gas interest in setting up a trust,
although the converse would be true had he transferred his legal
interests to the beneficiaries directly. In Reynolds v. Cooper,'2
the same three justices concurred with the majority in allowing
the depletion deduction where in their view the beneficiaries had
been vested with a remainder interest in the corpus of the trust,2
but distinguished the case from Helvering v. FalkY'
As a large part of oil and gas operations take place on public
lands leased by private parties, it might be well to note that the
doctrine of intergovernmental immunity does not now prevent
the levying of a general non-discriminatory tax on the income of
oil and gas lessees who operate on state and federal lands.3 1 The
Coronado case, 2 holding that a lessee of state lands was an instru-
mentality of the state and exempt from the federal income tax;
and the Gillespie case,"3 holding that a lessee of federal lands was
27. 291 U.S. 183, 54 S.Ct. 353, 78 L.Ed. 719 (1934).
28. 291 U.S. 192, 54 S.Ct. 356, 78 L.Ed. 725 (1934).
29. In Cooper v. Reynolds, 60 F.(2d) 650 (D.C. Wyo. 1932), the district
judge held that the determining factor was whether the beneficiaries had an
interest in the corpus of the trust. This decision was affirmed in 64 F.(2d)
644 (C.C.A. 10th, 1933), certiorari was granted in 290 U.S. 616, 54 S.Ct. 66, 78
L.Ed. 538 (1933), and the ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 291
U.S. 192, 54 S.Ct. 356, 78 L.Ed. 725 (1934), on the basis of Helvering v. Falk,
291 U.S. 183, 54 S.Ct. 353, 78 L.Ed. 719 (1934).
30. Supra note 27.
31. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 58 S.Ct. 623, 82
LEd. 907 (1938).
32. Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 52 S.Ct. 443, 76 L.Ed.
815 (1932). See Burnet v. Jergins Trust, 288 U.S. 508, 53 S.Ct. 439, 77 L.Ed. 925
(1933), as to a lessee of city lands.
33. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 42 S.Ct. 171, 66 L.Ed. 338 (1922).
1942]
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an instrumentality of the federal government and exempt from
the state income tax, have both been overruled . 4
III. TREATMENT OF ROYALTIES, BONUSES, AND OIL PAYMENTS
When a taxpayer possesses an economic interest in oil or kas
in place, he becomes taxable on the amount of the gross proceeds
realized therefrom by production and operation. Proceeds from
the sale of the entire interest are logically not includible in the
"gross proceeds from production and operation." 85 Therefore when
an owner of such an economic interest disposes of it in its entirety
by sale, his gain or loss is the difference between the sale price
and the "adjusted basis"8' 6 in his hands. The depletion factor does
not enter, and the transaction is governed by the provisions relat-
ing to capital gains8 7 Thus, when there is an absolute sale and no
economic interest is reserved, the full basis of the interest sold
must be recovered before there exists any taxable gain on the
transaction. 8
But suppose that the consideration consists of a speculative
interest in the future production of the property. This would
place the transaction in the "exchange" category, where the ordi-
nary measure of taxability is the "fair market value" of the prop-
erty or right received in exchange. But since the value of an oil
or gas right is highly conjectural,"' the taxing of the income, or
gross proceeds, is postponed until its later realization. Even
34. Supra note 81.
35. Darby-Lynde Co. v. Alexander, 44 F.(2d) 186 (D.C. Okla. 1930), af-
firmed 51 F.(2d) 56 (C.C.A. 10th, 1931), cert. denied 284 U.S. 666, 52 S.Ct. 40,
76 L.Ed. 564 (1931).
36. Internal Revenue Code, § 113(b).
37. Internal Revenue Code, § 117(a),(b). The capital gains rates are so
favorable (66% per centum of the gain is taxed if the capital asset has been
held between 18-24 months; only 50 per centum of the gain if the holding
period has been longer than 24 months) that the taxpayer will sometimes
attempt to place himself in the category where he may take advantage of
the capital gains percentages instead of the depletion percentages. These
percentages, however, do not apply to corporations. See McLean v. Commis-
sioner, 120 F.(2d) 942 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941), for an unsuccessful attempt to call
a leasing transaction a sale. Hence the government and the taxpayer often
shift sides in an attempt to get the most for their own advantage out of a
taxable transaction.
38. Subject to the capital gains limitations. See Internal Revenue Code,
§ 117(b). See also limitation of surtax on the sale of oil and gas properties-
the part of the surtax attributable to the sale of such properties cannot ex-
ceed 30 per centum of their selling price. Internal Revenue Code, § 105; U.S.
Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.105-1.
39. Another type of uncertainty is where there is a cloud on the title to
the oil or gas interest. Even though there is an adverse claimant, the in-
come from the interest is taxable to the possessor and he cannot be denied
the depletion deduction. Champlin v. Commissioner, 78 F.(2) 905 (C.C.A. 10th,
1935).
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though there is a market value for such oil or gas right, the un-
certainty is too great to afford a basis for the computation of in-
come until actual realization.4 0 When the income is finally real-
ized, the proper deduction is the depletion allowance, not the cap-
ital, gains percentages.
The speculative interest which the owner receives in return
for the sale is generally in the form of a royalty or oil payment
contract. A royalty is a fractional interest in the gross produc-
tion of the oil or gas, while an oil payment usually represents a
fixed sum to be paid to the vendor out of the gross production, or
out of a fractional portion of such production. In either case the
proceeds received are gross income subject to depletion.-"
If the owner receives, in addition to the speculative interest,
a cash payment, another set of rules applies. Where the specu-
lative interest is a royalty, the cash payment may be treated as a
bonus 2 or "advance royalty," and depletion may be taken on both
the royalty and the bonus."2 But where the speculative interest
is an oil payment,44 the cash payment is not subject to depletion,
40. Dearing v. Commissioner, 102 F.(2d) 91 (C.C.A. 5th, 1939).
41. Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S. 299, 53 S.Ct. 161, 77 L.Ed. 318
(1932); Commissioner v. Fleming, 82 F.(2d) 324 (C.C.A. 5th, 1936).
42. Depletion taken on a cash bonus or "advance royalty" must neces-
sarily be percentage depletion. Treated the same as "advance royalties" are
fixed bonuses which are payable each year regardless of production. Alice G.
K. Kleberg, 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941). See qualification to this right to take de-
pletion on bonuses or "advance royalties" stated in note 43, infra. But "de-
lay rentals" (payments by a lessee or assignee for the privilege of postponing
development) are taxed as ordinary income to the lessor or assignor, without
any depletion allowance. J. T. Sneed, Jr., 33 B.T.A. 478 (1935).
43. Pitman v. Commissioner, 64 F.(2d) 740 (C.C.A. 10th, 1933). The exist-
ence of a well is not a condition precedent to the right to take depletion on a
cash bonus or "advance royalty." Herring v. Commissioner, 293 U.S. 322, 55
S.Ct. 179, 79 L.Ed. 389 (1934). The difference between a cash bonus or "ad-
vance royalty" and a royalty Is, of course, the latter is dependent on produc-
tion. But the bonus is for anticipated depletion, and when it is certain that
this depletion will never occur (i.e., that there is no oil on the land; or that
none was found during the term for development, if a lease), then the tax-
payer's income will be adjusted so as to include the part of the bonus de-
ducted for depletion as ordinary income. Sneed v. Commissioner, 119 F.(2d)
767 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941), rehearing denied 121 F.(2d) 725 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941). This
restoration of the depletion allowance on the bonus is unnecessary if there
has been some production, it seems Immaterial how small. Dolores Crabb, 41
B.T.A. 686 (1940), affirmed 119 F.(2d) 772 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941), remanded on
other issue 121 F.(2d) 1015 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941).
44. The costs of oil payments, like royalties, must be recovered by deple-
tion, and their cost may not be recouped out of the gross proceeds from the
payments before reporting any gain on the transaction. Lee v. Commissioner,
126 F.(2d) 825 (C.C.A. 5th, 1942), holding that Laird v. Commissioner, 97
F.(2d) 730 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938), may be regarded as overruled. Pugh v. Com-
missioner, 49 F.(2d) 76 (C.C.A. 5th, 1931), insofar as it conflicts with Palmer
v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551, 53 S.Ct. 225, 77 L.Ed. 489 (1933), is no longer author-
ity. Commissioner v. Elliott Petroleum Corp., 82 F.(2d) 193 (C.C.A. 9th, 1936).
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and gain on the cash received is a capital gain.4 r In this case, how-
ever, the income received as oil payments is still gross income.'"
Where the owner receives both a royalty and an oil payment plus
a cash consideration, the cash is gross income subject to deple-
tion.4 7
The general rule seems to be that an absolute sale is effected
only when the consideration is a fixed and certain cash payment;
and that any vendor, lessor, or assignor who becomes possessed of
a right to a payment dependent on the development of the prop-
erty holds an "economic interest in the oil and gas in place."
This rule has been qualified in two important particulars:
First, no depletable economic interest is deemed to be re-
served by an owner who sells and conveys his rights for a share
in the "net profits of production." 48 Such a stipulation is con-
strued as a mere personal covenant on the part of the vendee,
assignee, or lessee; and even though development and production
are essential to the realization of such profits, the seller is not en-
titled to the depletion deduction.
Second, it is considered that no depletable economic interest
is reserved by an owner who sells his rights but retains a pro-
prietary interest as security for oil payments. Thus, in Anderson
v. Helvering,4 O where oil properties were sold for a specified
money consideration payable partly in cash and the balance with
interest out of one-half of the oil and gas produced or out of the
proceeds of the sale of these properties by the vendee, it was held
that the transaction did not give rise to a depletable right. The
set-up in the Anderson case was distinguished from that in the
45. Hammonds v. Commissioner, 106 F.(2d) 420 (C.C.A. 10th, 1939).
46. Ibid.
47. Badger Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F.(2d) 791, 793 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941),
cert. denied 314 U.S. 635, 62 S.Ct. 67 (1941): "retention of [this) overriding
royalty gave character to the cash consideration paid, and made it a bonus
depletable as additional advance royalty." This giving of the character of
advance royalties or bonus to the cash consideration when a royalty is stip-
ulated takes place whether an oil payment is present or not. Cf. Heep Oil
Corp. v. United States, 32 F.Supp. 762 (Ct. Cl. 1940). The oil payment by it-
self, unlike a royalty, is not a strong enough "economic interest" to impart
its own characteristics to a cash payment so as to make it a bonus. See Lee
v. Commissioner, 126 F.(2d) 825 (C.C.A. 5th, 1942), declaring that on most
points the treatment of royalties and oil payments is the same.
48. Helvering v. Elbe Oil and Development Co., 303 U.S. 372, 58 S.Ct. 621,
82 L.Ed. 904 (1938); Helvering v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S. 370, 58 S.Ct. 619, 82 L.Ed.
903 (1938), followed in Blankenship v. United States, 95 F.(2d) 507 (C.C.A. 5th,
1938).
49. 310 U.S. 404, 60 S.Ct. 952, 84 L.Ed. 1277 (1940). This opinion by Mr.
Justice Murphy is one of the best on the subject of depletion, and is a pleas-
ant contrast to those of some judges whose opinions show their unfamiliarity
with the nature and theory of the deduction.
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Thomas case50 by reference to the fact that the deferred payments
need not be out of the oil or gas produced or profits from the oil
or gas produced, but could be derived from the sale of the prop-
erty,5 and the fact that the deferred payments bore interest.5 2
But the retention of a lien on the oil production, and nothing
more, would not be sufficient to make a reservation of a mineral
interest a retention of security for payment. It is immaterial that
the deferred payments are to be in cash rather than in oil. In any
case, a personal covenant that such deferred payments shall at all
events equal a specified sum is evidence of an absolute sale, and
no reservation of an "economic interest in the oil and gas in place"
can be implied.5
The situation in a sale, lease, or assignment is for most prac-
tical purposes the same. The point to look for is whether the tax-
payer has, in effect, disposed of his entire rights, or whether he
has retained a right or rights sufficient to constitute an economic
interest in the oil or gas in place. Where there is this division of
ownership, each holder of a share in the oil or gas in place is
directly the owner of the part of the gross proceeds attributable
to his share. This is the reason why the holder of a right to share
in the "net profits" may not take depletion; the net profits are
taxable to and the depletion is allowed to the direct owner. The
transferor merely has agreed to accept an interest in the net
profits in exchange for his oil or gas interest.
The question next arises as to the treatment of a transaction
where a speculative interest is reserved but where the cash pay-
ments are not subject to the depletion allowance. The typical
example of this situation is where the consideration is a cash pay-
ment plus oil payments.
The taxpayer may not then and there recoup the cost of the
interest sold out of the cash payment,5 but he is allowed full re-
50. Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655, 57 S.Ct. 911, 81 L.Ed. 1324 (1937),
holding that the right to a payment out of oil or out of the proceeds of oil to
be produced should be regarded as a reservation of oil in place sufficient to
make the agreed payments, where there was no security taken nor any per-
sonal covenant to pay at any event.
51. Thus bringing the case under the rule that gross proceeds from the
property do not include proceeds from the sale of the property. See note 35,
supra.
52. Thus attaching to the deferred payments the character of a personal
covenant to make certain payments, which covenant does not effect a reser-
vation of a mineral interest. See Helvering v. Elbe Oil Land Development
Co., 303 U.S. 372, 58 S.Ct. 621, 82 L.Ed. 904 (1938).
53. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 60 S.Ct. 952, 84 L.Ed. 1277 (1940).
54. Neither may he recoup the cost of the interest purchased out of pro-
ceeds of oil payments until they equal the cost, but must depend on depletion
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covery of the depreciated cost of tangible well equipment and of
the expenses of the sale. The cost basis of the property thus ad-
justed should be allocated between the interest sold and the in-
terested retained on the basis of the ratio of the respective values
of the interests at the time of the transaction.5
Although it has been frequently stated that the determina-
tion of whether the taxpayer owns an economic interest in the
oil or gas in place is not dependent on the form of the instrument
or the terminology used, it is to be observed that many of the
decisions depend on the interpretation of some small phrase. Thus
a reservation of one-third of the oil or of the gross proceeds from
production may be construed as a royalty; while a reservation of
one-third of the net profits from the development, or a stipula-
tion that the payment reserved may be paid out of proceeds of the
sale or the proceeds of the production, will be treated as a mere
personal covenant so as to effect no reservation of a mineral in-
terest.
The most advantageous position for the taxpayer to take is of
course an individual problem, but it readily appears that:
(1) If he has a large cost basis, he may profit by having the
transaction treated as an absolute sale without reservation, and
would entitle him to a tax-free recovery of cost.
(2) If he has held the property over eighteen months or over
two years, the long-term capital gains holding period percentages
may be more favorable than the depletion allowances.
(3) If he has a small cost basis or none at all, a reservation of
an economic interest, which will entitle him to depletion from
all of the gross income from the property, will doubtless be to his
advantage.
IV. COMPUTING THE AMOUNT OF THE ALLOWANCE
In computing the amount of the allowance the taxpayer has
a choice of two methods: the cost method and the percentage
for a return of capital. See Commissioner v. O'Shaughnessy, 124 F.(2d) 38
(C.C.A. 10th, 1941), where plaintiff paid $25,000 for a $100,000 oil payment.
55. In Columbia Oil and Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F.(2d) 459 (C.C.A.
5th, 1941) the company sold certain leases (including equipment) for the cash
payment of $550,000 and a $350,000 oil payment. The court determined that
63 per centum of the Interest had been sold and 37 per centum retained; and
then allowed the following to be recouped out of the cash payment: 63 per
centum of the leasehold cost basis, the cost of the tangible equipment, and
the expenses of the sale. The difference between the total of these Items and
the $550,000 cash payment was a taxable capital gain. As to the 37 per cen-




method.56 He may use that which results in the greater deduc-
tion. A principal object in providing the percentage method alter-
native was to relieve the taxpayer of the rather complicated ac-
counting incident to computing by the cost method; but in actual
practice the allowance is computed by both methods, in order to
determine the greater deduction.
For cost depletion, the basis used is the same basis which is
used for computing gain, or the statutory basis adjusted for de-
pletion.57 This basis should not include (a) amounts representing
the cost or value of the land for purposes other than mineral
production, (b) the amount recoverable through deductions other
than depletions, such as depreciation, and (c) the residual value
of other property at the end of operations.-" However, this basis
should include those amounts of capitalized drilling and develop-
ment costs which are recoverable through depletion.5"
There are two types of drilling and development costs: (1)
intangible items which will not have any salvage value,60 and (2)
tangible items which will have a salvage value. The taxpayer at
his option may charge items of the first class to current expense,
or capitalize them and recoup them by means of the depletion and
depreciation deductions. "Any election so made is binding for all
subsequent years."'" Those items of the first class which are re-
coverable through depletion, if capitalized, are expenses in "clear-
ing ground, draining, road-making, surveying, geological work,
excavation, grading, and the drilling, shooting, and cleaning of
wells.'16 2 Those recoverable through depreciation, if capitalized,
are expenses of "wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., used
in the installation of casing and equipment and in the construc-
tion on the property of derricks and other physical structures."6 8
56. The percentage depletion method was introduced to take the place of
discovery depletion,, which is now used only in computing depletion on mines,
other than metal, coal, or sulphur. See Revenue Act of 1926, § 204(c), (1), (2);
Internal Revenue Code, § 114(b) (2); U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-3.
57. "The basis upon which [cost] depletion ... is to be allowed ... is the
basis provided in Sec. 113(a) [Internal Revenue Code], adjusted as provided
in Sec. 113(b) [I.R.C.], for the purpose of determining the gain upon the sale
or other disposition of the property." U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-2. See
§§ 19.113(a)-i to 19.114-1.
58. U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-2.
59. See note 62, infra.
60. "All expenditures for wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., inci-
dent to and necessary for the drilling of wells and the preparation of wells
for the production of oil or gas." U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-16-(a)-l.
61. U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-16-(d). As to whether the taxpayer
may be permitted to show that he did not intend a binding election, see Lucas
v. Sterling Oil and Gas Co., 62 F.(2d) 951 (C.C.A. 6th, 1933).
62. U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-16-(b)-l.
63. U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-16-(b)-2.
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The option does not exist in adjusting expense items of the sec-
ond class."
As aptly stated in Hardesty v. Commissioner:5
"The drilling and development costs dealt with by this article
are those incurred by a taxpayer in connection with the devel-
opment of his own property or lease. The option granted by
the regulations does not extend to costs incurred under turn-
key contracts,6 or costs which are part of the costs of a com-
pleted well which has by agreement been drilled quid pro quo
as the purchase price of the property or for an interest in it.
The regulation was not intended to and does not apply to costs
incurred in connection with drilling of wells as the purchase
price of or as consideration for an interest in the lands of
others."
After the basis applicable to the mineral deposit has been
adjusted, "the [cost] depletion for that year shall be computed by
dividing that amount by the number of units68 of mineral remain-
ing as of the taxable year, and by multiplying the depletion unit,
so determined, by the number of units sold within the taxable
year."69 The number of units remaining includes the number of
units sold within the taxable year.70 The number of units sold
does not include "units with respect to which depletion deduc-
tions were allowed or allowable prior to the taxable year."71
The taxpayer may, in lieu of the cost depletion method, de-
64. Besides tangible expense items not having a salvage value, "the op-
tions do not apply to any expenditure for wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, sup-
plies, etc., in connection with equipment, facilities, or structures, not incident
to or necessary for the drilling of wells." U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-16-
(c)-1.
65. 127 F.(2d) 843, 844 (C.C.A. 5th, 1942).
66. Contracts wherein the driller agrees to furnish all material and work
required to complete a well, and to turn over the completed well in condition
ready to "turn the key." Grinson Oil Corporation v. Commissioner, 96 F.(2d)
125 (C.C.A. 10th, 1938).
67. Cf. State Consolidated Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 66 F.(2d) 648 (C.C.A.
9th, 1933). But "footage contracts," and contracts where the driller is hired on
a "cost plus" basis, are within the option. U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-16-
(a)-1. See Commissioner v. Ambrose, 127 F.(2d) 47 (C.C.A. 5th, 1942). The
controlling point seems to be whether the driller is an independent contrac-
tor, or an agent of the lease owner or landowner.
68. The customary unit is the one to be used, as "barrels of oil," or
"thousands of cubic feet of natural gas." U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-2.
69. U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-2. See sample computation, note 79
infra.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid. Where a taxpayer reports on the cash basis, this Includes "units
for which payments were received within the taxable year although produced
or sold prior to the taxable year, and excludes units sold but not paid for in
the taxable year."
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duct from his gross income from the oil or gas property, an
amount equal to 27% per centum thereof,7 2 if this method results
in a larger depletion allowance.7 1 Gross income from the property
means gross income from the property to the taxpayer,"" and the
word "property" refers to the separate tracts or leases of the tax-
payer." The deduction computed through the percentage method
may not exceed 50 per centum of the net income (computed with-
out allowance for depletion) of the taxpayer from the property.7
"Net income from the property" and "operating profit" are synon-
ymous, but for the purpose of applying the 50 per centum limita-
tion development, expenses should not be deducted from gross
income in determining net income."
The principal advantages of the percentage method are:
(1) the simplicity of its computation;
(2) that even after 100 per cent of the capital has been re-
couped by use of the percentage method, the taxpayer
may continue the deduction of 27% per cent of his gross
income;7"
(3) that the taxpayer may deduct intangible drilling and de-
velopment costs as expense, and still take the same amount
of percentage depletion;
(4) that the percentage deduction may be taken on some pro-
ceeds even before oil or gas production has begun, for
example, bonuses and advance royalties.79
72. Internal Revenue Code, § 114(b) (3).
73. U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-4. Thus the taxpayer is not bound to
one method whether he begins using one method or the other.
74. Crews v. Commissioner, 89 F.(2d) 412 (C.C.A. 10th, 1937). Gross in-
come from the property is based on the value of gas or oil at the mouth of
the well. Greensboro Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F.(2d) 701 (C.C.A. 3rd,
1935). But gross income to the taxpayer does not include rents and royalties
paid on the property by the taxpayer, nor bonuses paid in certain cases. See
§ 19.23(m)-1-(f)-4.
75. Vinton Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 71 F.(2d) 420 (C.C.A. 5th,
1934).
76. U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-4.
77. Ambassador Petroleum Corp. v. Commissioner, 81 F.(2d) 474 (C.C.A.
9th, 1936). But a taxpayer who elects to deduct development expenses In
computing taxable income cannot refuse to deduct such expenses in comput-
ing "net income from the property" in applying the 50 per centum limita-
tion. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 60 S.Ct. 18, 84 L.Ed. 101 (1939),
and also F.H.E. Oil Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 104, 60 S.Ct. 26, 84 L.Ed. 109
(1939).
78. Commissioner v. Elliott Petroleum Corp., 82 F.(2d) 193 (C.C.A. 9th,
1936).
79. The following Is a sample computation prepared by the writer, which
may be of Illustrative value: Suppose a taxpayer acquires certain oil property
for $20,000, and reliable estimates show that 50,000 barrels of oil are expected
to be extracted. Assume that the property will have no salvage value after
the mineral is removed. At the end of the first year there Is no change In
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V. CLOSING REMARKS
There has been considerable agitation especially on the part
of the Treasury Department, to erase percentage depletion from
the statute books. In the writer's opinion, the percentage method
could be eliminated entirely or reduced materially, because it is
only an alternative to the general rule-cost depletion; but the
laws could not be altered constitutionally so as to allow a tax-
payer materially less than cost depletion. 80
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the estimate of the oil in place, hence the per unit cost basis would be de-
termined by dividing $20,000 by 50,000-a per barrel cost basis of 40 cents.
During the first year's operations, 20,000 barrels of oil are produced and sold
for $20,000. The cost depletion deduction would then be 40 cents multiplied
by 20,000, or $8,000. The percentage deduction would be 27 per centum of
the gross proceeds ($20,000), or $5,500. Cost depletion being greater, the tax-
payer will deduct $8,000 for the taxable year and have a taxable income from
the property of $12,000.
At the end of the first year the cost basis of the property has been re-
duced to $12,000. During the second year of operation, 30,000 barrels of oil
are produced and sold for $30,000, but estimates show that 20,000 barrels of
oil still remain to be extracted. This indicates that at the start of the second
year there were 50,000 barrels of oil in place. The cost depletion is then com-
puted by dividing the adjusted cost basis ($12,000) by the mineral in place
(50,000 barrels at the beginning of the second year), or 24 cents per unit.
Cost depletion for the second year is then 24 cents multiplied by the 30,000
barrels sold, or $7,200. Percentage depletion is computed by taking 27 per
cent of the gross proceeds ($30,000), or $8,250. Percentage depletion being
greater, the taxpayer will deduct $8,250 from his gross proceeds and have a
taxable income from the property during the second year of $21,750. The
cost basis of the property will be reduced from $12,000 to $3,750 at the end of
the second year.
During the third year 40,000 barrels of oil are produced and sold for $40,-
000, and the well is exhausted. This means that at the start of the third year
there were 40,000 barrels of oil in place. Cost depletion would be equal to the
remaining basis, or $3,750. (Computed by dividing the adjusted basis [$3,750]
by 40,000, or 8.8 cents cost depletion per barrel. For the year, then, it
would be 8.8 cents multiplied by 40,000, or $3,750.) Percentage depletion would
be determined by taking 27 per centum of the gross proceeds ($40,000), or
$11,000. Percentage depletion being greater, the taxpayer will deduct $11,000
from $40,000 and have a taxable income of $29,000. It is immaterial that $7,-
250 more than the cost basis has been recovered. ($8,000 plus $8,250 plus $11,-
000, or $27,250.)
80. See discussion, note 4 supra. Under this theory, the present statutory
allowance for depletion is constitutional, because it permits the taxpayer to
recoup his cost basis at least. "In no case shall the deduction computed [by
the percentage method] be less than it would be if computed upon the cost
or other basis." U.S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23(m)-4. It would seem otherwise
if the statute provided that the percentage method must be used when it re-
sulted in a lesser deduction than the cost method. In the early days of the
modern Income tax Chief Justice White dismissed the argument that an
allowance less than cost recovery permits a partial tax on capital, with the
reasoning that the tax is an "excise levied on the results of the business of
carrying on mining operations," and not a tax on the substance of the mine.
Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 114, 36 S.Ct. 278, 281, 60 L.Ed. 546,
554 (1916). Since 1916 the court's knowledge of income tax accounting has
been greatly enriched by experience, and despite the glib assertions in recent
opinions that the deduction is a matter of grace, it is by no means certain
that the theory of the Baltic case would stand up if put to the test today.
